SUPeR Feature Article: The Impact of Global Threats on Funding  for US Special Operations by Cantwell, Megan
Susquehanna University Political Review 
Volume 11 Article 1 
4-2020 
SUPeR Feature Article: The Impact of Global Threats on Funding 
for US Special Operations 
Megan Cantwell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.susqu.edu/supr 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cantwell, Megan (2020) "SUPeR Feature Article: The Impact of Global Threats on Funding for US Special 
Operations," Susquehanna University Political Review: Vol. 11 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.susqu.edu/supr/vol11/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Susquehanna University Political Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, 




The Impact of Global Threats on 
Funding for US Special Operations
By: Megan Cantwell
Abstract
This paper examines whether funding for 
special operations reflects the global threats that are 
faced by the United States. Organized special 
operations units first began to appear in the US 
military during WWII, but it was not until Vietnam 
that they were fully organized and integrated as part 
of the strategic plan, and the role of SOF expanded 
as the conflict continued. However, following 
Vietnam, the SOF programs that had developed were 
essentially gutted, due to the unpopular nature of 
SOF units among conventional military leaders. This 
research examines whether funding for SOF 
operations aligns with the threats faced by the United 
States, or if the political nature of the allocations 
process has more of an impact on the levels of 
funding for SOF programs. By examining shifts in 
threat since the development of the Special 
Operations command in 1987, and defining those 
shifting threats (as defined by strategy documents 
such as the National Security Strategy and 
Quadrennial Defense Review) as either a 
conventional or special operations threat, I studied 
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whether funding for SOF programs aligned with the 
threat. After examining six shifts in threat between 
1987 and 2020, it was found that funding for 
SOCOM tended to respond to shifting threats.  
Introduction:
In recent American memory, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) has entered the forefront of 
popular culture. Following the terror attacks on 
9/11/2001, the US began significant counter-
insurgency operations that necessitated the use of 
SOF for the last 18 years–leading to significant 
increases in the size of the forces available, along
with resources. During this time of expansion, 
countless movies, TV shows, books, and work-out 
regimens capitalized on the fervor and secrecy 
surrounding Special Operations, especially the Navy 
SEALs following the assassination of Osama bin 
Laden. But with all the media and popular attention 
now caught on ‘the silent professionals’ it is hard to 
remember that following the conflict in Vietnam, the 
US wanted to forget about unconventional tactics, 
and focus strategic efforts on conventional war. 
Special operations are described as “Small, 
elite, military units with special training and 
equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory 
through land, sea or air to conduct a variety of 
operations, many of them classified” (Feikert). 
Conventional warfare, however, is generally two or 
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more clear actors meeting on a battlefield, in a more 
winner-take-all style–for example WWI and WWII.  
As the US has increased its SOF capacity, 
there is the potential need to re-focus on conventional 
forces. Discussion has started around if the US were 
to have to enter a traditional land war with a near-
peer competitor, how well will Congress and the 
branches would respond to a need to reallocate 
resources.  This is not simple speculation, with the 
rise of China and their military buildup in the South 
China Sea and Russian aggression in Ukraine, there 
is a real potential that the US could have to enter 
another ‘great power war’. If that is the case, will 
resources move with the risks that the country faces? 
Or will administrative inertia take over? To explore 
the question of resources moving with need, I will be 
examining whether the size of SOF has reflected 
current threats or if there are other factors influencing 
the funding process.
History:
Beginning in WWII, small, elite units began 
to pop up with distinctive missions that took different 
forms from the conventional operations and fighting 
styles taught to the majority of the troops: the Office 
of Strategic Services, air commandos, Scouts and 
Raiders, and the 1st Special Service Force (SOF 
Before USSOCOM). After successful operations 
during WWII, however, the Army Special Forces 
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that had developed, along with the OSS, were shut 
down as the US shifted focus to the growing threat of 
the Soviet Union. It was believed that war with the 
Soviet Union would not require irregular warfare, 
but would be a full conventional conflict, and 
therefore there was no need for a force dedicated to 
a style of conflict that was viewed as “outdated and 
inappropriate” by military leaders (Marquis 1997, 
11).  
When the conflict in Korea began, outside of 
a few Ranger units, SOF was not particularly 
utilized, and following the conflict SOF was cut 
again. Vietnam was the first conflict where SOF was 
a significant actor whose role was expanded as the 
conflict continued (Paul, et al.). The likelihood 
increased that the US would become more heavily 
involved in the region, President John F. Kennedy 
became more interested in the use of SOF in the 
conflict, particularly following the failure at the Bay 
of Pigs. Kennedy authorized a major expansion of 
SOF and repeatedly worked towards its further 
development as he saw that the US may need to 
become involved in unconventional wars that it 
currently had no effective way of fighting. 
However, among the conventional military 
leaders, there was no enthusiasm for these new 
‘cowboy’ units. Following Vietnam, the military had 
learned some hard lessons and vowed never again. 
During the military backlash following Vietnam, 
cuts were made across the military. SOF capabilities 
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were depleted as the military never wanted to fight 
another irregular conflict again. However, in the 
1980s there was a move by key individuals within 
Congress and the military leadership to again 
develop a SOF capability. Following a period of 
general decline in the 1970s, several members of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee in 1983 began to 
push for change and improvement within SOF.  Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC) had been 
created in 1980 but it was not sufficient for the 
growing needs. Reform bills were introduced in 
1986, and eventually US Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM) was created. 
President Reagan approved the establishment of the 
combatant command on April 13th, 1987, which 
marked the beginning of real improvement to SOF 
capabilities (USSOCOM History, 9).
Throughout the next few years, SOF and 
SOCOM began to run and support conventional 
operations, including Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 
peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, and non-
combatant evacuations, developing and acquiring 
SOF specific equipment, and continuing to push for 
an increased role in American national security. 
The biggest change to SOF came following 
the terror attacks on 9/11. The US was forced to 
reevaluate its needs, and SOCOM was at the 
forefront of that evaluation. Afghanistan has 
significant SOF involvement. Beginning in late 
2001, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy 
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Franks gave the lead in combating the Taliban to US 
SOF, to conduct unconventional warfare operations 
to remove the power of the Taliban within 
Afghanistan- to a fair amount of success through 
operations in Tora Bora, the securing of Kabul, and 
countless operations behind enemy lines 
(USSOCOM History, 86-109). SOF forces were 
some of the first on the ground and heavily involved 
in the removal of Saddam Hussein. Operation: Iraqi 
Freedom led to the “largest SOF deployment since 
the Vietnam War” (USSOCOM History, 11). 
However, the success that has been found has also 
led to extended involvement in the region to maintain 
stability involving both SOF and conventional 
forces, and US SOF still helps to train regional 
forces, particularly as groups such as ISIS began to 
rise within Iraq in the 2010s. The US also remains 
involved in other counter-terrorism operations 
around the world.  
Literature Review:
The literature that exists surrounding the 
growth of SOF, particularly following the terror 
attacks on September 11th, notes that SOF, JSOC, 
and SOCOM have become very good at a specialized 
skill set- counter-terrorism, finding and containing 
weapons of mass destruction, and irregular warfare 
(Morrison). As the US began to be involved in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan, there was a significant increase 
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in the role of SOF, as evidenced by “the Bush 
Administration’s 2004 decision, through the Unified 
Command Plan, to assign USSOCOM the primary 
responsibility for prosecuting the Global War on 
Terrorism” (Spearin 2006). This move was sparked 
by the “the need for anti-terrorism and 
counterinsurgency expertise and the asymmetric 
nature of many current threats” that General Peter 
Schoomaker described as a ‘logical military 
response’ (Spearin 2006). Beyond simply looking at 
decision making power, evidence of SOF expansion 
can be seen even in recent years. In 2017, Owen 
West, the assistant defense secretary for special 
operations, made a request to increase the number of 
SOF operators to more than 71,000; to put this in 
context, prior to the attacks on 9/11, there were only 
around 33,000 SOF operators (South, 2018). 
As the probability of conventional war with a 
near-peer competitor, the different specialties of SOF 
and conventional forces become important. Special 
Operations can be defined as “Unconventional 
actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained 
campaign, undertaken by specially designed units, to 
enable conventional operations and or resolve 
economically politico-military problems at the 
operation or strategic level that are difficult or 
impossible to accomplish with conventional forces 
alone” (Spulak). SOF forces have an entirely 
different set of training and skill set from 
conventional forces, and therefore, while they can 
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certainly be complementary to conventional forces in 
a conventional conflict, SOF is not designed for large 
scale, long term conventional war. Rather, special 
operations should be used as a response to the 
varying needs of a war that are suited to SOF 
capabilities (Spulak). Specifically, capabilities of 
SOF include: conducting operations with ally nations 
including training other international forces, rapid 
deployment and response times, assessing specific 
local situations, gaining access to hostile territory, 
and conducting operations in unfriendly 
environments with limited support and low profile 
(Joint Publication 3-05). 
Congress does not seem to be inclined to 
currently make major changes to the size of SOF, as 
described in a Congressional Research Service report 
by Richard Grimmett, Congress has in the past used 
its power of the budget to respond to public opinion 
and what they feel should be the goals of US foreign 
policy to limit military action. In the CRS report, 
Richard Grimmett notes the situations, such as 
Vietnam, Somalia, and Rwanda, where Congress has 
pushed back against the military objectives of the 
President. Examples include not allowing 
supplemental budget money to go to the conflict in 
Vietnam, and starting court cases about the War 
Powers Act due to the US involvement in Kosovo. 
This indicates that Congress will use its powers to 
make it harder, or  stop entirely, the execution of 
foreign policy and national security goals that it may 
11th Edition
17
not be behind or wants to prevent happening in the 
future.  
The process of deciding on defense funding 
is long and complicated. In theory, a national security 
strategy ranking of threats is developed by the 
executive and military leaders. This will be the 
framework that service branches will use to see what 
is needed to adequately address the threats laid out in 
the strategy- this stage being the planning stage. 
Then, in the programming phase, the services receive 
their guidance and look at how they plan to meet the 
strategy on a broad level. Next is the budgeting 
phase, which determines the final costs of programs 
and sends in the estimate of what their budget will be 
to the Secretary of Defense. Once this stage is 
complete, the budget is sent into the Office of 
Management and Budget for the White House, which 
then incorporates the proposed budget into the 
President’s overall budget (Hays, Vallance and 
Tassel). 
However, there are clear examples of 
individual interests of members of Congress 
impacting the process, such as projects that are set to 
be shut down and are re-opened, and areas that are 
requesting more funds not receiving those funds. In 
some cases, it is the political realities of a member’s 
district. A prime example of this is when military 
bases are set to be scrapped. Bases can be a huge 
positive economic impact on a community, as they 
bring in jobs. A member of Congress could step in to 
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prevent a base closure in their constituency, even if 
that base is recommended for closure by the military 
(Schnaubelt 2017).  
Outside of individual interests, there is even 
further complication to the allocations process, with 
near-constant pressure to cut back spending 
competing with the need to maintain the strategic 
edge above peers. The cost of weapons development, 
as well as the costs associated with maintaining a 
large, a large active-duty force, is not to be ignored 
(O’Hanlon 1997). The debates over how much 
defense is actually enough, and what kind of defense 
we should have, along with a level of risk that can be 
accepted play heavily into the decisions (Guillot 
2014). Factors that tend to increase defense spending 
include war, economic growth, unemployment, and 
partisanship (Heo and Bohte 2012). Defense 
spending is particularly difficult, as Domke (1984) 
notes in “Waste, Weapons, and Resolve: Defense 
Posture and Politics in the Defense Budget” that 
defense spending is volatile, bouncing between 
exponential growth and austerity measures faster and 
more frequently than almost any other budget area. It 
is also a particularly political process, as defense 
spending can be the backbone of a political 
campaign, whether it is to rapidly increase or 
significantly decrease the spending. Domke found 
that domestic policies play an important role in the 
budgeting process, and that ultimately “political 
change is related to changing patterns of allocation
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in the defense budget” (Domke 1984,  388). The 
situation especially includes the politics of military 
and civilian leaders within the Pentagon, along with 
the politics of the current administration (Domke 
1984).
Outside of the political complications of the 
allocations process, there are other factors at play. 
Anthony Cordesman performed a deep dive into the 
proposal side of the procurement process and came 
across several failures on the military’s side when 
deciding what to fund. “There is no doubt that the US 
is capable of conceptual thinking about national 
security. What is far less clear is that the US is 
capable of efficiently translating such concepts into 
practice: the need to effectively manage defense 
programs and budgets, and deal with immediate and 
near-term needs” (Cordesman 2010). Some of the 
problems facing the procurement system come from 
increasing costs of personnel, maintaining readiness, 
and general budgeting issues facing the country as a 
whole--all of which have to be considered when 
looking at the DoD budget. Cordesman recognizes 
spending control issues within the military, 
particularly once a ‘status quo’ has been established. 
Once a program or system is in place, it is often very 
difficult to get rid of those projects. The movement 
away from annual planning has also been 
problematic, and mismatching between the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and Strategic goals in 
the budgeting process are further unhelpful. There is 
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also the ultimate issue of each service wanting to 
acquire resources and influence for itself, which will 
do nothing but further potential incongruities in the 
budgeting process. Because of the self-serving nature 
that the military branches and leadership can have in 
their role, blind spots in strategy can emerge, creating 
a mismatch between what is being funded, and what 
the concerns facing the nation and our allies are 
(Breitenbauch and Jakobsson, 2018).
In 2018, as interstate competition becomes 
more of an issue, it is likely that defense spending 
will continue to increase, as it is more expensive to 
compete with constantly improving near-peer states. 
Technological innovation will be key, along with 
force modernization and general increases to defense 
capacity (Grieco 2018). There are arguments that the 
most effective use of US defense resources would be 
to actually make the US military less active. “Used 
sparingly, American economic and military power 
should not be squandered in futile attempts at 
remaking the internal affairs of other countries by the 
point of a spear” (Grieco 2018). If this argument 
were to prevail, and the US was to refocus to prepare 
for a great power conflict, there should be a decrease 
in SOF operations (as those are frequently ‘remaking 
the internal affairs of other countries) and therefore a 
decrease in the funding for SOF, while also likely an 




In theory, if the development of SOF forces 
has adapted based on the threats that the US is facing, 
then the resources being allocated to the 
development of SOF forces, relative to the amount 
being allocated to all defense resources, should align 
with times when the US is facing more 
unconventional threats, but decline during times 
when there is a focus on more conventional dangers. 
However, that may not necessarily be the case due to 
the nature of the allocation process. Congress and the 
American people, following the events of Vietnam, 
swore to never fight another conflict like it again, and 
leaders who were more comfortable with 
conventional warfare cut back SOF resources in the 
1970s. But by the 1980s there was already movement 
towards the reform and expansion of SOF. It is 
possible that aside from the initial cuts following the 
conflict in Vietnam, Congress, along with the 
military leadership, made changes to SOF resources 
not based on need and national security goals, but 
rather based on what they wanted to fund. In more 
current times, there may be a question on whether the 
budget process is motivated by threat, or what the 
most politically feasible program is. 
Hypothesis: Funding for SOF will not reflect the 
national security challenges. 
IV: Whether the threats faced by the United States 
would be best addressed by resources aligned with 
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conventional warfare or irregular warfare. Irregular 
warfare threats include terrorism, instability due to 
the weakening of states, risk of insurgency, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Conventional warfare is a traditional conflict 
between two states. While assessing QDRs, NSSs, 
and other documents, I decided based off the 
language of the documents themselves what the more 
significant threat was, and then classified those 
threats based on earlier definitions of SOF in my 
literature review (ie Spulak and the Joint 
Publication). Conventional was slightly harder to 
define, but I considered conventional threats those 
against a defined, recognized state that would 
involve defined battles. For example, war with 
Russia would be a conventional threat as Russia is a 
recognized state, with resources that more closely 
match the US, that would most likely be engaged in 
a traditional battle to battle sense, whereas a terror-
organization does not have defined borders, and tend 
to engage in ‘guerilla-style’ tactics that cannot be as 
well addressed by conventional forces. 
DV: Funding for SOF, relative to the size of funding 
for major force programs based on the total 
obligation authority from Congress that was 




Due to the nature of SOF, there is a limited 
amount of data that is available to be analyzed. In 
order to explore the size of SOF related to the threats 
at the time, I examined times where there has been a 
major shift in the threat since the development of
SOCOM, and looked at the funding for SOF 
immediately prior and then immediately following, 
to see if there was a change. 
For the shift in threat, I analyzed National 
Security Strategies and Quadrennial Defense 
Reviews for their overarching goals and threats for 
each period of time. Both of these publications are 
only published every few years and tend to focus on 
the big picture. While there is a political tint to the 
publications as they represent the goals of a specific 
administration, they also outline clearly what they 
believe the threats to be, and therefore indicate what 
programs should receive more funding. 
After achieving a holistic look at each period 
of time, I identified times when the threats facing the 
United States shifted in a significant way from the 
previous period. For this paper, I examined 1987 as 
it was immediately after the founding of SOCOM, 
1993 as it was after the end of the Cold War, 1998 as 
the US moved away from peacekeeping operations 
and began to focus on new emerging threats, 2002 
following the terror attacks on 9/11 and US 
involvement in Iraq, 2010 as the US is deeply 
11th Edition
24
involved in the war on terror, and 2017 as the risk of 
war with a near-peer competitor begins to increase. 
Once the shifts are established, I will classify 
if the threats during that time are more SOF oriented 
threats, or rather more along the lines of conventional 
operations. Counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, 
and counter-WMDs are examples of areas that are 
aligned with SOF capabilities; while the threat of 
conventional war from a near-peer competitor aligns 
with the development of conventional forces.  After 
classifying the threats as either conventional or SOF, 
I examined the funding. For funding, I compared 
what percentage of funding SOF receives, compared 
to the DoD budget for major force programs in a 
given year, in order to avoid any issues of inflation.  
Research:













From the time that SOCOM was established 
in 1989, funding has had periods of fluctuation, but 
the trend over time has been increasing. Figure one 
tracks the percentage of funding that SOCOM 
received as part of the total MFP budget since 1987. 
Outside of the founding of SOCOM and 2001, 
funding has remained above 0.5% of total funding 
for major force programs, as demonstrated in figure 
one. 2001 is an outlier, as that year, following the 
attacks on September 11th, there was a significant 
request for emergency funding by President Bush, 
which interfered with the percentages at that time. 
During the 1990s, funding tended to hold steady 
between 1.3 and 1.5 percent, and it was not until 
around 2010 that there was a major jump in funding, 
followed by a significant decrease between 2017 and 
2018, with the 2020 FY increasing the trend again. 
The year with the highest percentage was a tie 
between 2015 and 2017, at 2.7%, with the lowest 
years being 1987 and 2001, although both of those 
years have specific reasons. Excluding 2001, the 
only year after 1987 that funding dropped below 1% 
was 1991. The average percent spending across all 
years was 1.5%.
1987:
The National Security Strategy in 1987 
identified the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to 
the security of the United States as the Cold War was 
still happening, and at the time did not seem like it 
would be ending any time soon. The US was focused 
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on deterring hostile attacks (ever aware of the threat 
of a great power war), strengthening alliances, and 
the increasing prevalence of international terrorism. 
The threat of the Soviet Union consumed most of the 
National Security Strategies of 1987 and 1988, and 
although terrorism is listed as one of the threats, most 
of the strategies pushed by the government are in 
response to the communist threat. The first principle 
goal listed in the 1987 National Security Strategy 
document is “To deter hostile attack of the United 
States, its citizens, military forces, or allies and to 
defeat attack if deterrence fails” (NSS 1987). 
While there are some roles where SOF may 
be helpful in combating the spread of communism 
such as in El Salvador, the overarching threat of a 
great-power war is more geared towards nuclear 
deterrence and conventional forces, as demonstrated 
by the large number of ground-troop forces that were 
deployed to Europe. The policy of containment was 
one main area where SOF could assist with 
combating the threat of the Soviet Union, however, 
the design for containment that was laid out in the 
National Security Strategy of 1987 pointed to more 
of a conventional means of containment, such as 
keeping many military installations in Europe (as 
well as around the rest of the world) with large 
numbers of conventional ground forces. 
Statements from political leaders at this time 
matched up with the threats assessed by the NSS. 
President Reagan spoke, tried, and pointed out 
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attempts in his 1987 State of the Union address about 
maintaining resolve against the threat of the Soviet 
Union, and tried to rally support for his defense 
budget by calling on data about the defense spending 
of the Soviet Union, and attempts around the world 
to maintain freedom from communism, which 
illustrates the split nature of the threat during this 
period as both conventional and irregular.  
In 1987, when SOCOM was founded, SOF 
operations were allocated .05% of the total defense 
budget for major force programs of $282 billion. The 
following year, SOF was allocated 0.7% of the major 
force program budget of $287 billion, rising to 1.09% 
of $291 billion in 1989. This shows an increase in 
funding, with a split in threats leaning much more 
heavily towards conventional. 
1993:
By 1993, the Cold War had fully finished, 
and American defense spending and strategy 
statements had begun to shift to reflect a new global 
order with the US as the sole hegemon. President 
Clinton’s administration outlined the goals of global 
stability, open and democratic governments around 
the world, and open international trade; while 
acknowledging the need to participate in 
peacekeeping and counter-proliferation efforts to 
achieve the goals of an open and democratic world. 
This is a major shift from the previous period of the 
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Cold War, when the US was focused on defeating an 
existential threat to its existence. 
“Our great nation stands at a crossroads in 
history. We have entered a world radically 
transformed in the last four years…our 
former nemesis, the Soviet Union, so long an 
enemy bristling with tanks pointed at 
Western Europe and nuclear weapons aimed 
at us, is gone…” (NSS 1993, i). 
There was also very limited interest in peace-
keeping efforts around the world during the Cold 
War (unless they had to do with preventing 
communism), but as the US entered the role of 
hegemon more fully, there was a desire to spread 
stable, democratic systems around the world. 
“We must seize opportunities, both for the 
benefits that will accrue to us, and to further 
the prospects for peace, stability and property 
that can and should be shared by others 
around the globe. We must lead because we 
cannot otherwise hope to achieve a more 
democratic and peaceful future in a world
still rife with turmoil and conflict” (NSS 
1993,2).  
After years of the world seemingly holding its breath, 
waiting for the other shoe to drop, there was a strong 
desire for stability in the global system, without risk 
of a great war- “For the first time in more than forty 
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years, we are no longer faced with the constant threat 
of World War III (NSS 1993, 2). 
The 1993 goals are more aligned with SOF 
capabilities than with conventional. Peacekeeping, 
anti-insurgency and the stabilization of governments 
are more similar to the mission of SOF- and the goals 
of this period. The threats these goals were designed 
to address were regional instability and weapons 
proliferation. Regional instability and the need for 
counter-insurgency operations was a SOF aligned 
goal, as was the proliferation of WMDs. During this 
time, peacekeeping operations designed to help with 
regional instability were more of a conventional 
mission. There was much less risk of a great powers 
war, or even conventional war between the US and 
another power, during this period of time, due to the 
US status as the global hegemon. 
In 1991, total funding for major force 
programs was $310 billion, with SOCOM making up 
0.85%. By 1994, major force programs were reduced 
to $251 billion, and SOCOM made up 1.2%. This 
indicates that as the threats were more SOF oriented 
(counter-insurgency and WMDs), funding for SOF 
increased. 
1998:
By the late 90s, there was another shift in the 
tone of national security strategy documents. The 
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increasing prevalence of globalization, and the risks 
associated with it, came to the forefront. In the 1997 
NSS, globalization was the first challenge discussed 
under the ‘Challenges and Opportunities heading’. 
Associated with globalization are the risks of ‘outlaw 
states and ethnic conflicts threatening regional 
security, along with WMDs, and terrorism. As the 
world becomes more globalized, threats that used to 
mainly impact small portions of the world become 
much more significant to the US national interests 
and therefore more serious threats. “In short, our 
citizens have a direct stake in the prosperity and 
stability of other nations, in their support for 
international norms and human rights, in their ability 
to combat international crime, in their open markets, 
and in their efforts to protect the environment” (NSS 
1997,1).
The first Quadrennial Defense Review, 
published in 1997, outlined risks that the US would 
be facing in the 21st century as “…the threat of 
coercion and large-scale cross-border aggression 
against US allies and friends in key regions by hostile 
states with significant military power” (1993 QDR, 
3).  
An example of the threat of WMDs is North 
Korea, who while also posing a military threat to the 
US ally South Korea, is also during this time 
continuing to actively pursue the development of 
nuclear weapons. The spread of WMDs is mostly a 
SOF oriented threat, while cross border aggression is 
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harder to define, the cases discussed in the QDR 
include states such as Iraq and Iran interfering with 
the flow of goods in the region, and the continuing 
threat of North Korea as more conventional, defining 
this period as a time of split threats.
In 1996, $255 billion was dedicated to major 
force programs, with 1.3% dedicated to SOCOM. In 
1993, $269 billion was allocated for major force 
programs, with SOCOM staying approximately the 
same at 1.1%, and then 1.2% in 1994 when funding 
for major force programs was $251 billion. For this 
period, the threats were split between conventional 
and SOF, and there was no significant change in 
funding, as it stayed within a range of 0.3%.
2002: 
Following the terror attacks on 9/11, the 
national security strategy of the US experienced a 
major shift. The US was now focused on the war on 
terror. Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001, there was real focus put on going after the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. The Afghan 
government quickly fell in 2001, and while 
negotiations began to establish a new government, 
US forces continued significant counter-terror 
operations. Osama bin Laden was a major target, as 
the orchestrator of the 9/11 attacks, but the entire al-
Qaeda organization, along with the Taliban, were the 
subject of numerous operations. This shift also 
marked the beginning of a period of war for the US, 
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and the extended US involvement in the region as a 
whole.
The 2002 National Security Strategy 
acknowledged that global terrorism was now the 
leading risk, and the complications faced due to it not 
being a threat best met by conventional means. “The 
United States of America is fighting a war against 
terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single 
political regime or person or religion or ideology…it 
will be fought on many fronts against a particularly 
elusive enemy over an extended period of time” 
(NSS 2002, 5). Regional conflicts also remain a 
leading risk in this strategy document, as it is 
recognized that failing states are incubators for 
terrorism. Finally, WMDs are considered a 
significant risk, as the rise of ‘rogue states and 
terrorists’ makes the weapons much less secure than 
they had been previously. The Quadrennial Defense 
Review from this period in 2001 also recognizes 
these threats, recommends that the US will need to 
be able to deploy to critical areas of the world more 
regularly, and notes the key role that SOF forces will 
need to play to combat these threats. 
The goals and risks of this period align neatly 
with the use of SOF:  counter-terror, counter-
insurgency, and counter-WMDs.
“Our nation will be steadfast, and patient and 
persistent in the pursuit of two great 
objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist 
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camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring 
terrorists to justice. And second, we must 
prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons 
from threatening the United States and the 
world” (Bush, 2002). 
Unlike many previous State of the Union addresses, 
the 2002 speech by President Bush puts a clear focus 
on what the US military has accomplished early on 
in his address, and highlights that the war on terror is 
significant and “may not be finished on our watch” 
(Bush 2002). 
In 2000, SOF made up 1.3% of the major 
force program budget of $286 billion. In 2002 
however, following the 9/11 attacks and the invasion 
of Afghanistan, SOF increased to 1.4% of the $355 
billion budget and then 1.5% of the $433 billion 
budget in 2003. During this time, the threats were 
particularly SOF oriented, but there was no 
significant change in funding for SOF operations 
during this time. 
2010:
In 2010, following extended involvement in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East region as a 
whole, the goals and threats had shifted some. While 
counter-terrorism remained a major focus, the 
proliferation of WMDs, particularly the development 
of nuclear weapons in places such as North Korea 
and Iran, was listed as one of the top threats facing 
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the US. Economic security is also a problem, 
following the crash of the housing market and the 
development of economic security was a major goal 
of the 2010 strategy. 
During this period of time, there was a 
significant increase in counter-terror and counter-
WMD operations, and therefore also a significant 
increase in the number of SOF operations.  “Above 
all, the United States and its allies and partners 
remain engaged in a broader war- a multifaceted 
political, military and moral struggle- against Al 
Qaeda and its allies around the world” (QDR 2010, 
iii). Both the war against terror and the proliferation 
of WMDs are SOF oriented threats, and there was a 
marked increase in SOF activity during this time.
In 2009, total major force program funding 
was $665 billion, with SOCOM holding 1.8% of that 
funding. By 2010, MFP was up to $691 billion, with 
SOCOM at 1.7% of that funding, and then rising to 
2.1% of the $689 billion in 2011. This is a significant 
increase in SOF funding during a time with SOF 
oriented threats. 
Current: 
In the most recent National Security Strategy 
from 2017, the leading threat is the rise of near-peer 
competitors, including China and Russia. Counter-
terrorism and WMDs remain as risks, but the general 
tone of the document is to promote American 
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development to compete with rising peers, as well as
focusing on internal problems. 
The rising risk of near-peer competitors is 
discussed in the NSS of 2017 as a significant threat. 
“The United States will respond to the growing 
political, economic and military competitions we 
face around the world. China and Russia challenge 
American power, influence, and interests, attempting 
to erode American security and prosperity.” In the 
case of China, the threat of another ‘great power’ war 
is more of a conventional threat and would be best 
addressed with an increase in conventional forces. 
This may not hold as true with Russia, who engages 
in more hybrid forms of war but would likely still 
call for an increase in conventional forces to be more 
on par with the current SOF-orientation.  However, 
the unconventional threats from previous years are 
still present, including the risks of terrorism and the 
increasing proliferation of WMDs. 
Beginning in 2017, 2.7% of the $609 billion 
dedicated to major force programs was for SOCOM. 
In 2019, SOCOM was allocated 1.9% of the $689 
billion for MFPs and in 2020 it is set to be allocated 
2.1% of $718 M. This shows a decrease in funding 
over time, with a split in threats that leans to the 




Figure 2: Findings Analysis 
As demonstrated in figure two, following the 
examination of six periods of shift, four of those 
shifting threats had a correct response with funding, 
making my hypothesis that funding would not follow 
threat incorrect, as the funding did indeed tend to 
follow threat. Despite the concerns of the political 
nature of the allocations process, these findings seem 
to indicate that serious changes or increases in threat 
will lead to a responding change in capacity. 
However, I believe that SOF may be somewhat 
different from the military as a whole, given it is a 
fairly small portion of the budget that is not as likely 
to have direct political impacts for members of 
Congress. The political impact for military leaders 
has also shifted since the Vietnam era, as there has 
been demonstrated successes associated with SOF 
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capability, and, if anything, leaders seem to be more 
likely to potentially over-rely on SOF. 
Further looking into the data since 1987, 
there have been an increasing number of threats that 
are SOF oriented. Therefore, it makes sense that in 
most of the shifts analyzed, there was an increase in 
SOF funding. It could also be argued that reduction 
of SOF funding in the most recent years can be 
attributed to a potential over-reliance on SOF during 
the late 2010s, and the budgeting processes and 
systems responding to that significance. 
Moving forward, it will be interesting to 
examine whether funding for SOF will fully respond 
to the rising threat of war with a near-peer 
competitor, or if the increased reliance on SOF that 
marked the 2010s will hold true. The cut in funding, 
as mentioned earlier, seems to indicate that the 
process recognizes and adjusts for threats, however, 
the funding still sits at a significantly higher 
percentage than the average over the 33-year time 
span of this study, and seemed to be on the uptick 
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